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DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE HOT SUN: HOW SMALL
FIRMS DO BUSINESS AND PROCESS CONFLICTS IN KENYA
Elin Cohen*
Considerable amounts of money have been spent on reform projects aiming to strengthen
institutions supporting business transactions in developing countries. To be able to evaluate the
type and extent of reforms needed, this article presents a thick description of business practices
among smaller businesses in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Entrepreneurs in developing countries
form long-term relational contracts with a very limited number of suppliers, with whom disputes
are rare and generally resolved without third party involvement. However, when entrepreneurs
are unable to rely upon relational contracts with their customers, disputes are common and often
remain unresolved. Due to the limited availability of suitable fora, firms are cautious to expose
themselves to riskier transactions. Private mediation options have emerged in certain locations,
but have, at present, limited reach. This article expands our understanding of business practices
among smaller businesses in Africa and highlights institutional gaps, which if addressed, could
prevent disagreements and facilitate dispute processing.

Introduction
It is well understood that smaller enterprises play a role in propelling economic
development on the Sub-Saharan continent. 1 Studies from Sub-Saharan Africa estimate that
                                                                                                                      
*Elin Cohen holds a JSD from Stanford Law School and is currently a consultant and a part-time lecturer at the
University of Washington School of Law. I am grateful to Stewart Macaulay, Deborah Hensler, Thomas Heller and
Bruce Owen for valuable comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank John Marie Mbeche and Dennis
Willa for excellent research assistance and the editors at the Journal of International and Comparative Law at
Chicago-Kent College of Law for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral
Dissertation Research Award for funding this research project.
1
See Oliver Masakure, et al., Performance of Microenterprises in Ghana: A Resource-Based View, 16 J. SMALL
BUS. & ENTERPRISE DEV. 466 (2009); Michael McPherson, Growth of Micro and Small Enterprises in Southern
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micro and small businesses employ seventeen to twenty-seven percent of the adult population. 2
Considering that the majority of the population (sixty to ninety percent) is engaged in
agricultural and pastoralist activities, the importance of this sector is significant. 3
There is growing interest in supporting smaller enterprises in order to promote economic
growth. 4 In fact, billions of dollars have been spent on legal reform projects. 5 Moreover, there
is a growing consensus that the stability and the quality of institutions 6 supporting business
transactions are a determinant factor for economic development. 7 However, what is less well
understood is which legal institutions matter. 8 Thus, assessing which legal institutions play a
significant role in economic development involves highly contextualized evaluations, based on
different countries, regions, industries, and segments of the population. 9 Hence, it is of great
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Africa, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 253 (1996); Donald C. Mead, The Contribution of Small Enterprises to Employment
Growth in Southern and Eastern Africa, 22 WORLD DEV. 1881 (1994); Donald C. Mead & Carl Liedholm, The
Dynamics of Micro and Small Enterprises in Developing Countries, 26 WORLD DEV. 61 (1998); Lisa Daniels &
Donald C. Mead, The Contribution of Small Enterprises to Household and National Income in Kenya, 47 ECON.
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 45 (1998).
2
Daniels & Mead, supra note 1, at 45.
3
Id.
4
Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics,
56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 896 (2008).
5
Id.
6
DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt &
Douglass North eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or,
more formally…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Thus, institutions reduce uncertainty
in a society by establishing a stable structure around human interaction”).
7
NORTH, supra note 6, at 6; DANI RODRIK, IN SEARCH FOR PROSPERITY (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (arguing that
the quality of institutions is crucial for economic development); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING:
GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Cornell Univ. Press 2004) (arguing that stable and wellfunctioning institutions are a precondition for economic development); Acemoglu, et al., Institutions as the
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ECON. GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven
Durlauf eds., 2005); Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test
of an Institutional Explanation, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 590 (1997) (employing various indicators including the rule of
law, the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation to show that the ability of
poor countries to improve their economy is determined by the quality of institutions). Although much of the focus is
on the quality of formal, public institutions (See, eg., The World Bank Group, Doing Business-Measuring Business
Regulations, available at  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (where the World Bank is annually ranking countries’
formal regulatory environment according to the ease of doing business). It has also been recognized that informal,
private institutions play an important role in shaping business practices (See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of
Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2008)).
8
  Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 945.
9
Id. at 946 (“We hence conclude (rather in the spirit of Pande and Udry) that the next research frontier is likely to
entail a much more labor-intensive and context-sensitive analysis of particular legal regimes and institutions (both
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importance to understand how smaller businesses operate and what institutions they rely upon to
be able to evaluate whether there is a need to reform the system that supports business
transactions and to assess what type of change is needed. To date, there is sparse literature on
business practices in Africa. 10 Hence, this article seeks to expand our understanding of business
practices among smaller businesses in Africa, in order to evaluate where flaws exist and how
these flaws can be addressed.
There is a widespread assumption that small businesses in developing countries lack
access to justice and are therefore unable to fully participate in the marketplace. 11 However,
there is limited reliable data assessing the legal needs of these communities. 12 To this end, this
article examines business practices, the prevalence of business disputes, and the means by which
firms process their disputes.
To better understand the mechanisms that smaller enterprises rely upon to conduct
business and how these mechanisms affect their behavior, this article examines how small
businesses in western Kenya form business relationships and process business disputes. In
particular, this article explores the availability and relevance of three different layers of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
formal and informal) in particular societies”). See also Veronica Taylor, Frequently Asked Questions About Rule of
Law Assistance (And Why Better Answers Matter), 01 HAGUE J. RULE OF LAW 46, 50-51 (2009) (“The lack of
precision and predictability in rule of law assistance is also attributable to a widespread lack of baseline research
through which to develop ‘thick’ descriptions of the target legal system before we attempt the latest rule of law
intervention”).
10
See, e.g., Arne Bigsten & Paul Collier, Contract Flexibility and Dispute Resolution in African Manufacturing, 36
J. DEV. STUD. 1 (2000); Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, 24 WORLD DEV.
427 (1996); MARCEL FAFCHAMPS, MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (The
MIT Press 2004); Marcel Fafchamps & Bart Minten, Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy, 49 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 229 (2001); Julie Paquin, Business Law Transplants and Economic Development: An Empirical
Study of Contract Enforcement in Dakar, Senegal (2010) (unpublished dissertation, Faculty of Law, McGill
University) (on file with author).
11
COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
MAKING JUSTICE WORK FOR EVERYONE vol.1 (2008).
12
Cf. HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW (Hart Publ’g 1999) at
1(“The rather unusually intense spotlight currently trained on the civil courts [in England] has been said to reveal a
system in crisis: procedures that are too complicated; courts that are too slow; lawyers who are too aggressive;
litigants who are bewildered and traumatized by their experiences; and an unquantified body of citizens whose
access to the courts to vindicate rights is barred by these features. But where is the evidence for these assertions?”).
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institutions that business parties might rely upon to support their business transactions, which
are: (1) public institutions such as courts and chiefs; (2) personal business relations; and (3)
private, non-governmental institutions such as business associations. This article is based upon
extensive field work carried out among 279 small business owners in seven different towns in
Nyanza Province in western Kenya. 13 By exploring business practices among small business
entrepreneurs in western Kenya, this article surveys the extent and circumstances in which small
businesses in a developing economy rely upon a particular institution to process their business
disputes.

I. Review of the Literature on Business Transactions in Developing Countries
The simplest contracts involve a cash-and-carry transaction where the buyer purchases a
readymade product in cash and takes it with him when he leaves the seller. This form of
transaction is very common among small traders and is referred to as the “flea market
economy.” 14 A cash-and-carry transaction requires little previous knowledge about the other
partner because the buyer inspects the goods before purchase and the seller receives the full
payment instantaneously. These types of transactions naturally involve fewer disagreements
than more complex transactions. However, some argue that traders who avoid riskier
transactions are also restricting their firms’ growth. 15

                                                                                                                      
13

The fieldwork was carried out by the author from May 2007 to December 2007. During the field work, Jean
Marie Mbeche and Dennis Willa provided excellent research assistance. The study was funded by the FulbrightHays Doctoral Dissertation Grant. See infra Part II.
14
Fafchamps & Minten, supra note 10, at 231.
15
Id., at 231 (“The need for traders to personally inspect quality of each delivery, for instance, combined with their
unwillingness to delegate quality control to subordinates and their reluctance to hire additional workers for the fear
of theft, undoubtly restricts firm size and growth. The need to guard stock in person, the total absence of payment
by check (which adds to the risk of theft), the infrequent use of trade credit and the difficulty in placing orders
complicates the conduct of business and make trade very labor and management intensive.”).
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However, for two parties to engage in a more complex transaction, they need to know
that the other party has an incentive to fulfill its part of the contract. The parties might rely upon
legal institutions to induce contract performance. However, McMillan and Woodruff argue that
in many developing countries, the legal system is dysfunctional and contracting parties do not,
therefore, rely on the courts to enforce contracts. 16 Nevertheless, it is important to remember
that worldwide, most legal disputes never reach a court house. 17 Instead, in many disputes, the
aggrieved party is resigned to the fact that a breach of contract has occurred, but decides for
various reasons to take no further actions. 18 Of those disputes that are processed, 19 a large
proportion is resolved through negotiations between the parties or by resorting to fora that are
embedded in the social structure in which the dispute arose. 20 As a result, the majority of
disputes that are brought before a third party are not brought to court. 21 This does not
                                                                                                                      
16

John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2421, 2421 (2000).
17
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 1 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963) (describing how business entrepreneurs in Wisconsin relied upon informal customs and
understandings which often substituted formal provisions, and that formal sanctions were often replaced by informal
dispute resolution mechanisms); Stewart Macaulay, Freedom From Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?,
WIS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
18
Galanter, supra note 17, at 2.
19
To describe how disputes are dealt with, this article employs the term “processed” rather than “resolved.” As this
article will demonstrate, there are various ways parties cope with or process disputes without actually resolving the
dispute. Compare with, Bliss Cartwright, Marc Galanter and Robert Kidder, Introduction: Litigation and Dispute
Processing, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, note1 (1974) (“we prefer /…/ “processing” to “settlement” or “resolution” to
avoid the imputation that the process necessarily leads there.”); William L.F Felstiner, Influence of Social
Organization on Dispute Processing 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 63, note 1 (1974) (“this paper reflects a preference for
the term “dispute processing” instead of the more common “dispute settlement.” My aversion to “dispute
settlement” is based on the conviction that a significant amount of dispute processing is not intended to settle
disputes, that a greater amount does not do so and that it is often difficult to know whether a dispute which has been
processed has been settled, or even what the dispute was about in the first place”).
20
Galanter, supra note 17, at 2; Eric Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish
Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006) (discussing enforcement of rules and norms in the closed network of tuna
traders in Japan); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing enforcement of rules and norms within the closed network of
diamond traders in New York City).
21
Galanter, supra note 17, at 3 (“courts resolve only a small fraction of all disputes that are brought to their
attention. These are only a small fraction of the disputes that might conceivably be brought to court and an even
smaller fraction of the whole universe of disputes.”);  Cf. Republic of Kenya, Governance, Justice, Law and Order
Sector Reform Program, National Integrated Baseline Household Report, at 32 (2006), available at
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necessarily indicate that a well-functioning court system is not important for a healthy business
environment. Rather, as Macaulay has argued, the main function of trials is not dispute
resolution, but to deter other trials. 22
The social and economic community in which contracting parties are operating could
impose sanctions upon a party in breach. 23 Likewise a party could unilaterally impose sanctions
upon the breaching party in a contract. 24 Thus, it has been observed that market intermediaries,
such as trade associations, enable the flow of information about past transactions and can
coordinate collective sanctions against defaulting parties. 25 Private arrangements can induce
compliance through social pressure by exploiting concerns of losing one’s business reputation or
by threatening the use of violence. 26 Hence, this article explores how small business
entrepreneurs in a developing country form business relationships and process disputes. In
particular, the study investigates what public recourses exist and to what extent small business
entrepreneurs turn to these institutions to resolve their disputes. Moreover, the article explores
the role that personal business relationships play in influencing actors to take riskier transactions
and to process disputes. Finally, this article examines the extent to which private associations
have developed mechanisms to facilitate dispute resolutions.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.gjlos.go.ke/gjlos%20final%20report.pdf (the Government, Justice, Law and Order survey from Kenya
asked 12,000 randomly selected participants what the most common disputes in their community were and how
these disputes were resolved. The survey found that the third parties that most commonly were employed to mediate
disputes were the chief (45%), local elders (22%), and the police (9%), while only 4% identified the courts to
commonly resolve disputes).
22
Macaulay, Freedom From Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, supra note 17, at 780.
23
Bernstein, supra note 20.
24
Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship between Public and
Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2460 (2000).
25
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 16 at 2423; Bernstein, supra note 20, at 119-120.
26
Marcel Fafchamps, Spontaneous Markets, Networks, and Social Capital: Lessons from Africa, Oxford Economic
Papers GPRG-WPS-058, at 4 (2006) available at
www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/papers/details/spontaneous_markets_networks_and_social_capital_lessons_fro
m_africa/.
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A. The Role of Courts
The discourse on the role of courts in economic development has evolved from the rigid
view that courts are the main institutions enforcing contracts and that weak legal systems lead to
fewer transactions 27 to a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the use of courts in
commercial disputes. 28 It is well understood that parties might find court settlements irrelevant
to their needs because their case might not be settled for years or because the reliability of
enforcement may be uncertain. 29 Furthermore, it is costly to take a case to trial. 30 Hence,
disputes concerning smaller transactions do not reach the courts due to the high cost of legal
proceedings and the relatively low amount of money at issue in the dispute. 31 Moreover, some
parties believe that litigation would harm their business reputations. 32 Therefore, disputes
typically reach the courts when a business relationship has come to an end. 33 Instead, a variety
of factors, including the parties’ relationship, the efficiency and the reliability of the legal

                                                                                                                      
27

WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATIONS 41 (World Bank and Oxford Univ. Press
2004) (describing a hypotehetical scenario where a client refuses to pay a bill in full upon delivery of the agreed
goods and what would happen in four countries, ranging from “comply and pay” to not dealing with the client in the
first place. “Why the difference? The answer lies in the efficiency of courts-the main institution enforcing
contracts.”). See also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD
185 (June Abbott trans., Harper and Row Publisher 1989) (“All the evidence suggests that the legal system may be
the main explanation for the difference in development that exists between the industrialized countries and those,
like our own, that are not industrialized”).
28
Macaulay, Freedom From Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, supra note 17, at 780 (arguing that the
main function of trials is not dispute resolution, but rather to deter other trials).
29
Porat, supra note 24, at 2468.
30
Id. at 2467.
31
Id.
32
FAFCHAMPS, MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE supra note 10, at 67
(describing how respondents in African firms expressed anxiety about having their name muddied by the publicity
of a contractual dispute and did not want to acquire a reputation for undue toughness. Instead, private resolution of
contractual matters was deemed preferable).
33
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 16, at 2451 (found in their study among entrepreneurs in Vietnam that in 86%
of the cases where courts were used, the disputant’s relationship with the other party ended); See also Bigsten &
Collier, supra note 10, at 28 (found that firms in six African countries would only seek assistance from lawyers or
the court when they lost confidence in the other party. As long as the firm thought that the other party acted in good
faith, legal institutions were not invoked).
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system, as well as the availability of alternative dispute resolution forums determine how
disputants process disputes. 34

B. The Role of Relational Contracts
Globally, the exchange of goods and services often takes place between parties that have
built a relationship over time, rather than between strangers. 35 Macneil refers to this concept as
“relational contracts.” 36 The basis for this enforcement mechanism is a reciprocal cooperation
strategy. 37 Macaulay notes that “long-term continuing relations have their own norms and
sanctions that will serve to get almost all contracts carried out in an acceptable fashion.” 38 As a
result, it has been observed that the majority of contractual disputes are resolved amicably, which
enables trade between the disputing parties to resume. 39
Contract flexibility plays an important role in accommodating the realities of doing
business in a developing country. For instance, due to poor infrastructure and power shortages,
                                                                                                                      
34

See, e.g., Manuel A. Gomez, All in the Family: The Influence of Social Networks on Dispute Processing - A Case
Study of a Developing Economy, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 331-332 (2008) (In a corrupt legal setting, a
plaintiff’s decision about whether he will bring a case to court depends on whether he thinks the corrupt practice will
work in his favor or not. In a study on procedural choices among business disputants in Venezuela, Gomez finds
that social networks determine where disputes are settled. “An average business disputant in Venezuela knows that
the first step before filing a lawsuit is to identify a well-connected lawyer, a friendly court, a familiar judge, and of
course be open to gratify court employees for being diligent”).
35
  Jane Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal Financial Practices of Small
Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 193 (1994) (For a discussion on relational contracts among small
businesses in Taiwan); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard
Univ. Press 1991) (for a description of how cattle rangers in northern California settle disputes); Kathryn Hendley et
al., Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises, 52 EUR. ASIA
STUD. 627 (2000) (for a discussion on how business partners in Russia process disputes); AVNER GREIF,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006) (for a historical perspective of relational practices in medieval trade).
36
Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 886-887(1978).
37
Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 308 (1981). (Axelrod
refers to this strategy as ”TIT FOR TAT,” which he defines as “the policy of cooperating on the first move and then
doing whatever the other player did on the previous move.”)
38
Macaulay, Freedom From Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, supra note 17, at 788-789.
39
Bigsten & Collier, supra note 10, at 11 (found in a study of business practices in six African countries that firms
had long term and loyal relationships with their clients and suppliers. The study found that the majority of
contractual disputes were resolved amicably and trade was resumed in most cases).
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manufacturing businesses in Africa are often faced with delays beyond their control. 40 Hence,
studies on small business entrepreneurship carried out in Africa show that when a business party
is temporarily unable to perform, the contract is renegotiated. 41
Relational contracts work well in situations where it takes time and is costly to replace a
business relation. 42 Therefore, relational contracts are adequate in situations where a producer is
locked into a relationship because it is very difficult to identify reliable suppliers. 43 Fafchamps
finds that the difficulty in finding another reliable supplier gives value to the relationship and
incentivizes the supplier to extend credit to regular customers. 44 Cooter observes that
dependence upon relational contracts is stronger when the state enforcement of contracts is
ineffective. 45 He argues that relational contracts increase trust, but channel transactions away
from potentially better deals with outsiders, thereby reducing competition. 46 This assertion
presumes that there is an abundance of suppliers, but as this study shows, in many locations and
industries the number of available suppliers is very limited.
The passage of time is necessary for more complex transactions to take place, but it also
makes a party more vulnerable to a breach of contract. Likewise, creditors are vulnerable to a
breach of contract when available or suitable venues for recourse are limited, as they are in most
                                                                                                                      
40
  Marcel Fafchamps et al., Inventories and Risk in African Manufacturing, 110 ECON. J. 861, (2000) (found in a

study from Zimbabwe that manufacturing firms hold large inventories to shelter themselves from late deliveries and
late payments); Paquin, supra note 10, at 122–125 (found that firms in Dakar, Senegal were faced with uncertainties
due to poor infrastructure, unreliable supply of electricity, political instability in neighboring countries and
unpredictable public institutions).
41
See Bigsten & Collier, supra note 10 (found that firms expected contracts to be flexible and that contract
flexibility was the norm among surveyed firms in five African countries); Paquin, supra note 10, at 135 (argued that
firms adopted a flexible approach towards contract enforcement to preserve future relations).
42
Avner Greif, Commitment, Coercion and Markets: the Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange,
in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 727, 732 (Claude Ménard & Mary Shirley eds., 2005).
43
Fafchamps, supra note 26, at 15; Simon Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Courts and Relational
Contracts, 18 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 221, 261 (2002) (found in a study from Vietnam that customers paid their bills
because they had nowhere else to go if they lost their current supplier).  
44
Fafchamps, supra note 26, at 15.
45
Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2008).
46
Id.
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developing countries. Therefore, creditors are cautious and vet their clients carefully before they
extend credit. 47 McMillan and Woodruff found that firms offer customers credit when the
customer is locked into the relationship and finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier. 48 As
the use of formal collateral is impractical for most business transactions, trade credit gets
allocated on the basis of trust. 49 Trade credit is typically offered on a selective basis and those
who do not qualify for credit must pay in cash. Consequently, as only very small firms can
operate on a cash-only basis, the mode of establishing trust and selecting who gets credit is
believed to determine which firms have the potential to grow and which must remain microenterprises. 50

C. Business Associations as Market Intermediaries
It has been argued that trade associations or market intermediaries can substitute for a
weak legal system. 51 However, it has also been observed that business parties in certain
industries opt out of a seemingly functional public legal system to instead rely upon a private
order which is perceived to respond better to the particular culture and customs in the industry. 52
                                                                                                                      
47

FAFCHAMPS, MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 172173. (Discussion results from an extensive study among African firms to determine how trade credit from suppliers
was established. Fafchamps found that credit was extended to buyers based upon trust and reputation. In practice
this was attained by first having the buyer pay in cash to establish that the buyer was a good paymaster. A small
amount of credit would then be extended and, if the buyer was successful at paying on time, the credit limit would
be raised after a period of time. Some creditors would also inspect the client’s workplace to be able to locate the
client and to assess the success of the business. Business relations played a role in establishing credit while family
relations or formal requirements played almost no role in establishing credit).
48
John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 Q. J.
ECON. 1285, 1286 (1999).
49
Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, supra note 10, at 441.
50
Marcel Fafchamps, Ethnicity and Credit in African Manufacturing. 61 J. DEV. ECON. 205, 209 (2000).
51
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 16, at 2421; See also Deborah Bräutigam, Substituting for the State:
Institutions and Industrial Development and Eastern Nigeria, 25 WORLD DEV. 1063 (1997).
52
ELLICKSON, supra note 35, at 283 (finding in his study of cattle rangers that “members of a close-knit group tend
to develop informal norms whose content serves to maximize the objective welfare of group members. This
hypothesis suggests that people often choose informal customs over law not only because customs tend to be
administratively cheaper but also because substantive content of customary rules is more likely to be welfare
maximizing”); See also Feldman, supra note 20; Bernstein, supra note 20.
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Hence, studies have observed that when members of a group repeatedly transact with each other,
the members have an interest in adhering to the group’s internal rules so as to be able to transact
in the future. 53 In these types of vertical business networks, where members of the group are
continually transacting with each other, contracts between the members of the group can be
enforced through group punishment. 54 In her study of diamond merchants in New York City,
Bernstein describes how traders were dependent on membership in the industry’s bourse to be
able to conduct business. 55 Hence, parties to a dispute had to adhere to the same rules which
effectively could be enforced. 56 Other similar arrangements have been observed within
specialized industries in the United States, 57 in Japan 58 in ethnically-based business networks 59

                                                                                                                      
53

Bernstein, supra note 20; ELLICKSON, supra note 35; Winn, supra note 35, at 206; Greif, supra note 42, at 731
(discussing how public order institutions, such as courts and the police are sanctioned by the state, while private
order institutions rely mainly on social and economic sanctions).
54
Bernstein, supra note 20, at 115 (describing how diamond traders who dominated the industry developed an
elaborate set of internal rules and sanctions to handle disputes among industry members).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 128, 149 (finding that diamond traders used a very sophisticated method for group punishment where
internal arbitrators handle disputes between members of trade bourses. The existence and the outcome of the dispute
was kept secret as long as the parties complied with a decision on time. In case a party did not comply, the decision
and a picture of the non-complying member was posted in the club room and the information was also
communicated to all other bourses in the world federation. The exposure of a non complying member could put that
person out of business almost instantaneously).
57
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
58
Feldman, supra note 20 (finding in his study of tuna traders in Japan (a highly specialized and closely knit
industry) that a state sanctioned dispute resolution forum was embedded in the tuna trading market. This so-called
“tuna court” was exclusively used by the tuna traders for settling disputes, since it was highly adaptable and
responsive to the specific needs in the industry. The author argues that the tuna traders did not reject state law, as
such, nor did they utilize the centrally administered system of courts, but rather they embraced the specialized, statecreated tuna court).
59
It has been observed in many parts of the world that the ethnic makeup of prominent business communities is
quite different from that of the population at large. See Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Bernstein, supra
note 20; Bernstein, supra note 57. See also Yuan-Li Wu, Chinese Entrepreneurs in South East Asia, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 112 (1983); William Glade, The Levantines in Latin America, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 118 (1983); Vijaya
Ramachandran & Manju Kedia Shah, Minority Entrepreneurs and Firm Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36 J.
DEV. STUD. 71(1999); Tyler Biggs, Mayank Raturi & Pradeep Srivastava, Ethnic Networks and Access to Credit:
Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector in Kenya, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 473 (2002) (finding that KenyanAsian firms could access trade credit more easily and faster than Kenyan-African firms due to their socialization
patterns which created channels for credible information flows).
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and in medieval Europe. 60
However, effective group punishment for non-compliance requires the circulation of
correct information about the contract breach and a coordinated community response. For the
community responses to be effective, the business network must (1) monitor and screen its own
members; (2) inspect both their members and the other parties doing business to verify the claim
of cheating; (3) coordinate community responses; and (4) ensure that all members adhere to the
sanctions. 61 The ability of business or trade associations to have such control over the dealings
of their members has proven to be difficult in most settings. Fafchamps, who has conducted
extensive research on manufacturing firms and agricultural traders in many countries in subSaharan Africa, finds no evidence of coordinated community responses in this region. 62 Instead,
he found that respondents displayed little fear that failing to pay a supplier would affect their
credit among other suppliers. 63 Fafchamps argues that coordinated punishment strategies are
difficult to sustain because a member of a business club that refuses to punish (not trade) with a
cheating buyer, will himself face punishment by other members. 64 This requires that members
be able to observe each others’ dealings and that the members be dependent on each other to
trade. 65 Hence, the literature demonstrates that collective sanctions administrated through
business groupings work in closed industries like the diamond industry, but appear to be difficult
to enforce in less coherent groups.
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Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); GREIF, supra note 35; Paul Milgrom, Douglass North & Barry Weingast, The Role
of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1991).
61
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 16, at 2426-2430.
62
Fafchamps, supra note 26, at 21; Fafchamps & Minten, supra note 10, at 257-258 (“Trust is established primarily
through repeated interaction. Information on bad clients does not circulate widely; hence, group punishment for
nonpayment is severly limited.”).
63
Fafchamps, supra note 26, at 21.
64
Id. at 19.
65
Id. at 17-21.
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II. Methods
This study was carried out in seven towns, located in four different districts in Nyanza
Province in western Kenya from May to December 2007. Nyanza Province is located in the
southwest corner of the country and is one of the country’s eight provinces. Nyanza is located
on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. The Lou is the main ethnic group in the province. 66 The
provincial capital is Kisumu, the third largest city in Kenya. The province is made up of twelve
districts and has a total population of 4.4 million people. 67
This study included seven towns, each with a population ranging from 22,000-65,000
people. 68 In each town there was one business association for small business entrepreneurs. An
enumeration of all the businesses in these towns showed that the five dominant trades were
carpentry, metalworking, tailoring, automobile repair maintenance and food production. The
food production traders were not included in the study as they predominantly conducted business
on a cash-and-carry basis, and some of the questions this study sought to answer were not
applicable to that group. The remaining four trades, which display similarities in both training
and business practices, formed the study population. The study population was grouped into two
strata. 69 The first stratum contained small business owners that were members of the small
business association. The second stratum contained small business owners that were not
members of the small business association. For the purpose of this paper, the two strata have
been merged unless otherwise noted. The study includes 279 participants, chosen through
optimum allocation, or in other words, through random sampling from the two groups. 70
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MILLENNIUM CITIES INITIATIVE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INVEST IN KENYA: FOCUS KISUMU JULY 2007 6-7
(2007) available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/documents/KisumuGuide-FINAL.pdf
67
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (KENYA), KENYA 1999 POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS 5, xxxiii (1999).
68
Id. at 3-2.
69
FLOYD J. FOWLER JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 33-34 (2001).
70
Id. at 18.
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Furthermore, focus group discussions with a smaller number of participants were carried out at
each of the seven locations after the survey had been administered. 71 The participants in the
focus group discussions were selected based upon their experience with the topics covered by the
discussions. 72 Moreover, multiple in-depth interviews with key informants were carried out. 73
In addition, the business associations’ meetings were observed throughout the research period. 74
To protect the privacy of the participants, the names of the towns are fictive.

III. The Business Communities in Nyanza Province
In Kenya, the small business sector is referred to as the jua kali sector. The term, which
in Swahili means “under the hot sun,” refers to small-scale retail, manufacturing, and service
businesses. The sector employs about two-thirds of the economically active population outside
of farming and pastoralist activities 75 and is considered to play a vital part in the country’s
economy. 76
The businesses included in this study were small manufacturing and repair businesses
with just a few employees. 77 Besides their regular employees, it was common for businesses to
hire temporary help for bigger orders. 78

                                                                                                                      

71
JOHN W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS APPROACHES 211
(2009).
72
Id. at 178.
73
Id. at 181.
74
Id.
75
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2002-2008 at 4 (2001).
76
GOVERNMENT OF KENYA, SESSIONAL PAPER NO 2 OF 2005 ON DEVELOPMENT OF MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES
FOR WEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION FOR POVERTY REDUCTION, iii (2005) (“Micro and small enterprises
(MSEs) cut across all sectors of the country’s economy and provide one of the most prolific sources of employment,
not to mention the breeding ground for medium and larger industries, which are critical for industrialization. Today,
these enterprises are found in every corner of Kenya and they have great potential for creating a variety of jobs,
while generating widespread economic benefits”).
77
The majority of firms did not have any regular staff (57%), 19 % of the participants had only one employee, 15%
had two employees and 5% had three employees. A small number of participants (4%) had four to eight staff, but
no one had more than eight regular employees. Of the 279 participants, 16% were auto mechanics, 29% tailors,
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The majority of participants started their own business because they could make more
money than if they were employed in the same profession (43%, N=119). One focus group
participant said, “I can’t accept to be employed because when employed, you only wait for your
salary that comes at the end of the month and you can be employed for only 300 shillings per
day. While here at jua kali you can even make 3,000 shillings per day.” 79
Most entrepreneurs used their own savings to start a business (65%, N=180). They
started often with just a few tools and would then add more tools and machinery as the business
progressed. One participant noted: “[As an employee,] I bought tools one by one every month
until I was ready to start my own garage.” 80 About a quarter of the respondents obtained
monetary or in-kind assistance from family or friends (24%, N=66). There were also instances
where a mentor assisted a trainee in opening his or her own shop (6%, N=16). However, loans
from micro-finance institutions were rarely used to start a business (4%, N=12). During the
course of running the business, fifteen percent of the entrepreneurs had taken out a micro-finance
loan, which most commonly was used for business-related investments. 81
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
24% metalworkers and 29% carpenters. Due to the nature of these businesses, a majority of all owners were men
(81%). The female owners were predominantly running tailoring businesses (94%).
78
It was also common to train apprentices in the workshop. An apprenticeship is typically two years (three for auto
mechanics) and the apprentice pays the trainer an annual fee. The fee is negotiated but is typically around 10,000
Kenyan shillings per year. Sixty-six percent of the participants had at least one trainee.
79
Focus group discussion #10, in Kumi, Kenya (Aug. 13, 2007). At the time of this research project, $1=68 Kenyan
shillings. Note that the stated earnings in this case are well above the estimated average. One quarter of the
participants started their own business because they could not find other employment (25%). It was much more
common for women (39%) than men (22%) to start their own business due to lack of other work opportunities.
However, an almost equal number of artisans (23.5%) started their own business out of desire to be their own boss.
80
Interview with Participant # 351214 (Oct. 18, 2007).
81
Microfinance loans were commonly used for a business related investment (77%) but were also used to pay
school fees (19%). As collaterals are often not available, it is a common practice that borrowers need to save a
certain amount of money with the micro finance institution before a loan is granted. Twenty two percent of the
participants said they were unable to save money and they could therefore not obtain a loan. One man said: “I earn
so little I can’t even afford to save.” One-fifth of the participants said that there was no microfinance institution
located close to their business. Participants from all the seven towns are represented in this category but in fact,
there were microfinance institutions (MFI) in all towns but one. People in the other towns might not have been
aware of the MFI or found the distance between the MFI office and their business to be too far. A third important
factor for why the participants did not seek out the MFIs can be attributed to their own personal bad experience
(13.5%) or friends’ or relatives’ (18%) negative experience with a microfinance institution. One auto mechanic
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Sixty-four percent (N=176) of the entrepreneurs did not keep accounting books of their
earnings. Consequently, a majority of the participants did not know what their profit was. Eight
percent (N=23) of the participants found their business to be successful. One carpenter said, “I
have done a lot with my business. I have a piece of land and good tools because of my
business.” 82 However, the majority of the owners (67%, N=186) thought that their business was
doing fair; while one quarter thought that it was not doing well.
Half of the participants included in this study were members of a small business association,
also known as a jua kali association. In each town, there was only one small business
association and the number of actively participating members ranged from thirteen to one
hundred and twenty. These associations were primarily started to be able to access assistance
from the government for small business development, but some associations also took an interest
in supplying their members with services that were otherwise not available. 83 The small
business associations observed in this study were made up of entrepreneurs who operated similar
types of businesses; and the members primarily transacted business with partners, such as
customers and suppliers, who did not belong to the association.

A. Crimes, Physical Security and the Police
Relatively few participants had been burglarized, but a break-in could have devastating
consequences for the individual business owner. The police appeared to play a rather passive
role in burglary investigations and a sizable number of victims of burglaries or attempted
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
said: “We fear it because [an MFI] collapsed with my 28,000 shillings.” There exists a myriad of lenders and as
there is not coordinated regulation or oversight it is not uncommon that money is misappropriated. Moreover, as the
interest rates on many microfinance loans are 20%, 10% of the participants found the loan condition unfavorable.
Finally, some entrepreneurs (7.5%) said they did not need a loan.
82
Interview with Participant # 321021(Aug. 22, 2007).
83
Elin Cohen, Improving the Business Climate Under the Hot Sun: Do Small Business Associations Make a
Difference? A Study of Four Districts in Nyanza Province, Kenya, (Mar. 12, 2010) (unpublished dissertation,
Stanford Law School) (on file with author).

  

16  

burglaries decided to not report the crime to the police. During the year preceding the study, five
percent (N=14) of the firms had been burglarized and another five percent (N=14) had
experienced an attempted burglary. 84 Fifty-five percent (N=154) of all the firms used either
shared or individual night security. 85 Some owners spent a fair amount of money on security, 86
despite the fact that an almost equal number of shops with security as compared to those without
security were attacked. 87
For the individual owner, a burglary could have catastrophic consequences. One such
owner explained: “Thieves came and broke into my workshop. I went to the police station and
the police didn’t do anything. I had hoped that they would find even one thing but they didn’t.
Everything that I had was gone and I had to start afresh. Stock worth over 100,000 shillings was
lost in a night.” 88 Moreover, if an artisan was burglarized and customers’ goods were stolen, the
artisan had to repay the customer. For instance, one artisan said: “I was burglarized at the store
where I keep my things. The customers took me to the chief and I have been paying them [back]
in bits.” 89
Fifty-nine percent (N=16) of businesses that experienced burglaries or attempted
burglaries reported them to the police. Besides the hope that the police would be able to recover
the stolen goods, which happened in only two of the sixteen reported cases, 90 business owners
reported that they found it helpful to file a formal complaint in order to explain to the customers
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Interviews with 279 study participants, in Nyanza Province, Kenya (Aug. 1 – Dec. 1, 2007).
Id.
86
Id. (One night watchman would typically cost 2,000-3,500 shillings per month, divided by the number of shops
that shared him).
87
We do not know if the businesses that did hire night guards were more prone to being burglarized. There might
be other explanations as well; the watchman could have been outnumbered by the attackers or complicit in the
burglary. One participant in a focus group discussion said, “At the time we had the break-ins we had two night
guards. When we asked them about the night raids they told us they never heard anything and so we decided to
terminate their services since we can’t pay them and still there is insecurity. For now we don’t have any night
security.” Focus Group Discussion #7, in Nne, Kenya (Nov. 19, 2007).
88
Focus group discussion #3, in Nane, Kenya (Nov. 14, 2007).
89
Id.
90
It appears that it was the same perpetrator in the two resolved cases.
85
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that their property had been stolen. One owner explained: “I had to report it so that I could prove
to the customer that indeed there was a break-in; and with that the customers gave me more time
to repay them.” 91 However, forty-one percent (N=11) of the victims of burglary or attempted
burglary decided to not report the matter to the police. The respondents stated the following
reasons for not reporting the attack: i) in case of an attempted burglary there was no point in
reporting the matter since nothing was stolen; 92 ii) the police could not act on the complaint
unless the business owner knew who the suspect was; 93 or iii) the business owner feared the
police. 94 One owner explained: “I didn’t report it. It was the second [burglary] in two years.
The first time I reported it to the police, but they ended up locking me in saying that I was the
one who sold the customers goods, then staged a managed raid.” 95 In some instances, following
an attack on the business premises, the business owner or his employees would sleep in the
workshop to guard the property. One such owner said: “I didn’t report [the attempted burglary]
because there were no suspects. So what I do is to sleep here in the workshop every night to take
care of it. I bought a generator for 40,000 shillings this year that is in the workshop.” 96 Another
owner reported that he would bring his tools home every night to keep them safe: “The police
asked if I suspected somebody. But I was home asleep. It was at night so how can I suspect
someone? They took machinery for 15,000 shillings. Now I carry my tools home every
evening. I take them home on the back of my bike.” 97
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Interview with Participant # 351208 (Nov. 18, 2007).
See, e.g., Interview with Participant # 330102 (Sep. 11, 2007) “I didn’t report it because nothing was stolen and I
had no suspects.”
93
See, e.g., Interview with Participant # 350238 (Oct. 24, 2007) “There was no need since I didn’t have any suspects
and the police is always insisting on a list of suspects.”
94
See e.g., Interview with Participant #330119 (Sep. 13, 2007) “No I didn’t report it. I fear dealing with them.
They once beat up a person [thinking] that he is a suspect; yet he was the victim.
95
Interview with Participant # 330115 (Sep. 13, 2007).
96
Interview with Participant # 391257 (Oct. 30, 2007). Cf. Fafchamps & Minten, supra note 10, at 230 (reporting
that grain traders in Madagascar slept in their store to ensure that their stocks were protected).
97
Interview with Participant # 341046 (Aug. 30, 2007).
92
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B. Business Relations and Business Disputes
The business relations that the small business owners in Nyanza had with their suppliers
and with their customers had very different characteristics. The relationships between the
entrepreneurs and the suppliers could be characterized as relational contracts. There were few
disputes between artisans and suppliers, and those that did occur were settled without outside
involvement. The relationships between artisans and their customers, on the other hand, were
more complex. Many more disputes arose between these two groups due to certain practices in
the business culture and flaws in sanctioning breaches of contract. As these businesses operated
in resource poor settings, a business culture developed where the primary focus was to secure
orders, with little consideration for whether the order could be delivered on time or if the price
would cover the cost of producing a good quality product. Secondly, the limited availability of
fast, fair and inexpensive means to resolve disagreements created opportunistic behaviors.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that some of these results are expected and
typical. For instance, even in some settings where access to reliable courts is widely available,
most disputes are settled without any litigation. 98 However, the prevalence of other findings,
such as late deliveries, the inability to collect debts, and the use of the police to enforce contracts
can be attributed to the specific business environment in which these enterprises operate.

C. The Relationships between Entrepreneurs and their Suppliers
There were very few suppliers in each of the seven towns included in this study. It
appeared to be common practice for these suppliers, at times, to collude to set a uniform price for
supplies. 99 Approximately half of the entrepreneurs travelled to another town to purchase
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See, e.g., Macaulay, Freedom From Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, supra note 17 at 779-780.
Interview with Participant # 390272 (Nov. 2, 2007).
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supplies. Due to the limited number of local suppliers and the extra time and cost involved in
purchasing supplies from another town, entrepreneurs did business with a limited number of
suppliers.
The entrepreneurs included in the study had, on average, only two regular suppliers. 100
Almost half of the main suppliers (47%) were located in the town in which the entrepreneurs
operated. 101 The artisans visited their suppliers frequently, sometimes daily. Most business
owners kept basic supplies in stock, but a new order generally required a visit to the supplier. 102
In between orders, the entrepreneurs visited the supplier to check on prices, settle bills, or to
inspect supplies with prospective customers before placing an order. As long as the entrepreneur
was satisfied with the quality of the material and the pricing, he or she took care to cultivate the
relation and remained loyal to the same supplier(s). 103
Two-thirds of the artisans could not buy supplies on credit, while twenty percent (N=55)
received credit from suppliers located in the same town. 104 A supplier might perceive it to be a
greater risk to grant credit to a customer located in another town because it is harder to visit that
workshop or learn from other customers or suppliers about that customer’s success or hardship in
the business. 105 It is unsurprising therefore that fewer artisans obtained credit from suppliers
located in a different town (12%, N=32). 106 For the most part, the entrepreneurs traveled in
person or sent an employee to collect supplies purchased on credit from a supplier in another
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Interviews with 279 study participants, supra note 84.
Id.
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See e.g., Interview with Participant # 321008 (Aug. 22, 2007) “I used to buy in bit but very frequently and so
with time they have come to know me.”
103
See e.g., Interview with Participant # 330102, supra note 92, “I am a long time customer and all my materials I
get from them.”
104
Interviews with 279 study participants, supra note 84.
105
Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, supra note 10 at 431.
106
Interviews with 279 study participants, supra note 84.
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town. 107 This was rather time-consuming and took at least half a day. Therefore, it is interesting
that, in a small number of cases, the business owner was able to call the supplier to have the
goods delivered by a matatu, or public service vehicle. One auto mechanic explained that “if a
matatu brings it, I pay them more than the normal [one way] fare since [the matatu crew] will go
and pick it [from the supplier] and bring it to my place of work.” 108 This is a very effective way
to order supplies because it is less costly and much more time–efficient, but it requires a higher
level of trust because multiple parties are involved.
As opposed to the diamond industry described by Bernstein 109 or the Bazaar economy
described by Geertz 110 where social and religious norms and values penetrate business decisions,
business decisions among small firms in Nyanza were a function of a partner’s trustworthiness as
demonstrated by previous transactions. Consequently, a supplier’s decision to grant credit was
most frequently based upon the trustworthiness of an entrepreneur, while family and social
relations played a marginal role. 111 In a vast majority of cases (76%, N=63) the entrepreneurs
were granted credit because they had been long-time, regular customers who always paid dues
on time. 112 One metalworker explained: “We have done business for a long time and he has
come to trust me since I always pay as agreed.” 113 An artisan could also gain a supplier’s trust
by being recommended by one of the supplier’s current “good” customers. Fifteen percent
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See e.g., Interview with Participant # 381126 (Sep. 26, 2007) “I always go personally since I am the one who
knows exactly I need to buy.”
108
Interview with Participant # 331080 (Sep. 6, 2007).
109
Bernstein, supra note 20 at 140-141.
110
Clifford Geertz, Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou, in MEANING AND ORDER IN MOROCCAN SOCIETY 159
(Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz & Lawrence Rosen eds., 1978).
111
See e.g., Interview with Participant # 351219 (Oct. 19th, 2007) “I had gone to buy from him. Then he gave me
more change. I noticed it after I had left his shop and it was evening. I took back the money the next day and we
become good friends. That’s when he told me I can always take supplies even if I don’t have cash.”
112
Interviews with 279 study participants, supra note 84.
113
Interview with Participant # 341051 (Aug. 30, 2007).
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(N=12) of those that had supplier credit were introduced to the supplier by another artisan. 114
Family relations (4%, N=3) and other social networks, such as church acquaintances (6%, N=5),
played a much less significant role in establishing credit with a supplier. 115
Disagreements between artisans and their suppliers were rare. During the year preceding
the study, only seven percent (N=19) of the participants had a falling out over a business matter
with one of his or her regular suppliers. 116 There was no third party involved in mediating any of
the disagreements. There were two possible outcomes to the disagreements: either the parties
settled the issue and resumed business or the business owner discontinued the relationship and
had to find another supplier.
The business relation continued in situations where the cause for the disagreement was
temporary. This was the case when artisans sent an employee to purchase supplies but the
supplier charged higher than the agreed price. One artisan explained: “I sent one of the people
working for me and the supplier didn’t know him and overcharged him. I went back and
introduced him and the employee… and also complained about the higher price charged. [The
supplier] was apologetic and refunded me part of the money and we still do business
together.” 117 This was also the case when mitigating factors caused the entrepreneur to not settle
a bill on time or when the supplier delivered supplies late. One carpenter explained: “I gave
them money in advance to bring me material and they took long, about one week. That made me
lose some business, but he is still my supplier since we handled the matter well.” 118 Even though
the incident could have accrued an extra cost, the business relationship continued in these types
of cases because it was a valuable relationship, in which trust could be reestablished.
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In a sense, some delays or misunderstandings could almost be expected and when the
explanation for the breach of contract was reasonable, the business partners could continue to
trade. However, in half of the cases, the business relationship was discontinued because the
disagreement was of a more permanent nature. 119 These complaints related to the substandard
quality of material or unjustified price increases. A metalworker explained a disagreement with
his former supplier: “They used to either inflate [the prices] or bring low standard material, so I
got another supplier who is more reliable.” 120 In the entire sample, there was only one dispute
between an artisan and his suppliers who extended credit. In that case, a misunderstanding
occurred and once the parties resolved the mistake, business resumed as usual. The artisan
explained: “I sent somebody to go and pay the money that I owed the supplier, but this money
didn't reach [him] as expected. When the supplier called, I told him that I had sent the money
and he wanted to con me. Later I found that he had not been paid and I apologized to him.” 121
In sum, the relationships between the artisans and suppliers were based upon relational contracts
where disagreements, when they did occur, were resolved between the two parties. Because
access to trade credit was desirable and because it took a long time to gain credit, business
owners avoided confrontations with suppliers once they had attained trade credit.
Cooter refers to a survey from Peru to illustrate how relational contracts channel
transactions away from potentially better deals with outsiders. 122 According to the findings
from the survey, businessmen were reluctant to change suppliers due to ineffective contract
enforcement. 123 Therefore, the survey found that the a new supplier would have to offer
material at a thirty percent lower cost before the businessmen would switch from their current
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supplier to a new supplier. 124 However, this study from Nyanza shows that a “better deal” is a
concept that involves more than just the price. As there were so few local suppliers, it was
relatively easy for the entrepreneurs to learn if the price and quality of the goods their
suppliers supplied was comparable to those of other suppliers. If another supplier offered a
better deal than their regular supplier, the entrepreneurs switched supplier. However, “a better
deal” was not just a matter of price or quality, but of a combination of factors. To gauge
whether the relationship with their supplier was worth maintaining, the entrepreneurs took the
price and the quality of the goods into consideration, 125 but most importantly, they considered
whether the supplier extended credit. 126 Moreover, the entrepreneurs valued that the trust they
had established with their suppliers allowed for some contract flexibility when one of the
parties was temporarily unable to perform. 127

D. The Relationships between Entrepreneurs and their Customers
The relationships between entrepreneurs and customers looked quite different from those
between entrepreneurs and suppliers. The artisans had many more relationships with customers
that were one time transactions, along with others that turned into long-term business relations.
Moreover, the nature of the relationships with the suppliers was such that interactions often
occurred several times per week. However, very few of the relationships with customers
involved such frequent transactions. Furthermore, there was much more competition among
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artisans because there were a large number of the same types of businesses in each location. 128
As a result, the artisans could more easily be substituted.
To understand how business relationships were formed, business owners were asked how
their last five customers had become their customers. 129 Most commonly, a customer would
walk in from the street (52%), sometimes after comparing prices. 130 However, recommendations
from other customers also played an important role (39%) in a customer’s choice. 131 Relatives,
friends and neighbors made up four percent of the customers, while less than two percent were
referrals from other artisans. 132 Marketing initiatives, including applications for public tender or
advertising, were also rare, at less than three percent. 133 The entrepreneurs valued regular
customers and, in order to retain these customers, three-quarters of the business owners gave
their regular patrons a preferred lower price. 134 Moreover, as will be discussed further below,
some business owners granted credit to retain their most loyal, long-term customers.
The most frequent disputes between customers and artisans concerned the quality of the
goods or service, late delivery, and late payments. 135 During the three months prior to the
survey, forty percent (N=109) of the respondents had had at least one customer place a complaint
about an order. 136 Of these complaints, fifty-nine percent were due to the late completion of
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work. 137 In thirty-four percent of the cases, the customer complained about the quality of the
work. 138 The remaining seven percent of complaints related to other issues, such as theft. 139
In most cases, the artisans handled complaints without the involvement of a third party.
For example, one artisan explained: “As a mechanic, what we see is maybe something gets lost
in the customer’s car, or the customer is not satisfied with how the work has been done. We sort
this by having a meeting with the customer to see how the matter can be well-handled.” 140 In
general, business owners wanted to settle the matter quickly and in a way that would not spoil
their reputation. One metalworker explained: “When the customer called me to complain, I
immediately went to his place. I don’t want complaints in my workshop because other
customers could hear that. I redid the work and shared the cost of the material with the
customer.” 141
The manner in which an artisan resolved a matter depended on the nature of the
complaint. If the customer was not satisfied with the quality of the work and only a small
adjustment or replacement was needed, the artisan would typically correct it free of charge. If
the customer wanted the alteration of a product due to events outside of the artisan’s control, as
in one instance when a pest invaded a chair that was already in the customer’s possession, 142 or if
the customer changed his mind about the specifications or brought the wrong specifications, then
the customer would normally pay for the correction. Alternatively, the customer could return the
product and, once the entrepreneur had sold it to somebody else, the business owner would
remake the product for the original customer. One surveyed artisan said: “We agreed that I sell
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that steel door, then make for him one that he likes.” 143 Moreover, the artisans would try to
protect themselves against complaints relating to the quality of the work by advising customers
to use good quality material. Eighty percent of the participants said they regularly advised a
customer to use good quality material even if it was more expensive. 144 One tailor explained:
“The clothes shrunk after a few washes and the customer came back to complain. But there was
nothing I could do because I warned her that the material was of low quality, but she insisted [on
using it].” 145
A majority of the complaints were related to work not being completed on time. The
difficult competition for orders made business owners take on orders that they knew they would
not be able to deliver on time. “The problem is that as a fundi [or artisan] you can never tell your
customer that you are busy. How can you send away three customers for the sake of one that
you have at that time? So there will be delay.” 146 Secondly, micro-businesses operate on very
small profit margins. It was not unusual for customers to pay in small installments, which made
it hard for the artisan to purchase the right material and finish the product on time. As one
metalworker explained, this compromised the quality and delayed the work: “We in jua kali, we
are survivors. At time you have stayed for one week without any work, then a customer come
and bargains. You won’t talk much because you fear you might scare him off. So once you
have been given the down payment, you end up using low quality metal. Then the customer
refuses to take this product. Then you have to convince them to wait until you sell it [to
someone else] or sweet talk them to just take it.” 147 Furthermore, due to low cash flow, an
entrepreneur would often use the down payment of a new order to finish up the last order.
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Hence, if the business owner did not get a new order soon after the first order, the first order
would be delayed. One metalworker explained: “It is not uncommon that we as jua kali, we
don’t have money. So sometimes somebody brings you work and you don’t have money. So
you take the work and find yourself spending this money…. At times you can get a loan from
somewhere else or another artisan or wait for you to get another order from a customer and use
their money to finish the first order.” 148 However, when the artisan did not finish the order on
time, there was ample flexibility for the artisan to negotiate additional time to finish the product.
In one case, an artisan explained: “The customer complained that the furniture was not done on
time; I told him to wait just one more day.” 149
For the business owners, customers’ late payments constituted the main source of
grievance. An owner explained that collecting debts takes “a lot in time and money because if I
give [customers] credit I will always call them on the phone or go in person to get the money.” 150
Debt collection was expensive and time consuming and the entrepreneurs had limited options for
recourse. One business owner complained: “There is no laid down procedure of repayment and
in case of default there is no place I can go for resolution.” 151 As will be discussed below,
owners could collect debts through the chief or through bribing the police, but this kind of
recourse was rare. Instead, the business owner typically carried the loss. For instance, a focus
group participant explained: “Once I have done work for someone and they don’t pay, I have to
forget about it. I have never taken any case to court. The only thing I do to make the customers
pay is just to try and follow up with them. If I am defeated, it’s a loss on my side.” 152 In order
to avoid exposure to the very credible risk of not being able to collect a debt, sixty-two percent
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(N=170) of the respondents did not grant credit to any of their customers, but dealt purely on a
cash basis. 153 The respondents also said that credit could encourage customers to complain
about the quality of the product. A survey participant said: “If a customer is given credit to then
pay later, they always come with complaints after the job is done, so that they can deduct the
balance they have. That's why I always avoid giving them credit.” 154 Moreover, other business
owners found that the process of claiming unpaid debts created hostilities and destroyed business
relations. One such owner explained: “Dealing on credit has made me lose money and some
customers too because when they don’t pay, they never come back.” 155 Another artisan put it
this way: “It saves time not to give credit and keeps the friendship between the customer and me
going.” 156
Although some artisans found that they could lose customers by granting credit, others
found that granting credit was a way to retain valuable customers. An artisan explained: “A
business cannot flourish only on cash sales so I give my most loyal and regular customers credit.
That ensures me that they will always come back.” 157 Therefore, the business owners that
granted credit (38%, N=106) to a selected number of customers did so after carefully screening
the customers. 158 Typically, these few, selected patrons were long-term, regular customers who
paid punctually. Business owners also considered new customers that were recommended by
existing “good” customers to be more trustworthy. For instance, one business owner said: “I
only give [credit] to a few who are either my regular and long time good customers or the ones
who have been brought to me by my good customers.” 159 The business owners tested the
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customer by starting out with a small extension of credit. They then increased the credit if the
initial sum was paid on time. One owner reported: “I started them with a little credit and
expanded it since they always paid as they said.” 160 Consequently, the relationships between the
business owners and customers that received credit can be characterized as relation contracts.
However, should the customer defect and not pay a debt, business owners had limited means of
recourse. Moreover, there was no coordinated information-sharing system that circulated
information about bad payers. Thus, in the absence of a credit rating bureau or a similar
arrangement, the incentive for customers to pay was of less significance because a default or late
payment did not affect future transactions with other businesses. Furthermore, in relationships
between the artisans and customers, as opposed to the relationships between the artisans and the
suppliers, the customers were not locked into a contractual relation because there were a
relatively large number of other businesses which could perform similar work. The combination
of these factors made it a risky venture to grant credit to customers.
Finally, entrepreneurs reported frustration with the late collection of goods. An
entrepreneur said: “Some people just bring their products for repair and they don’t come back to
collect it. At the moment, I have an ox plough that has been in my workshop for two years and
it’s not been collected. Should it get stolen the owner will ask me to pay for it.” 161In accordance
with the Sale of Goods Act, a buyer not collecting his order within a reasonable time is liable for
any loss occasioned by his neglect and to reimburse the seller for the storage of the goods. 162
Furthermore, the seller has the right to resell the product to another buyer, if the original buyer
does not collect the product within a reasonable time. 163 However, to avoid a dispute, many
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artisans chose to not resell the product “after a reasonable time”. One focus group participant
explained: “According to the law it’s allowed to keep a product for only 90 days. After that you
can dispose of it. But there is a problem in disposing it because the customer can come to claim
it on the 91st day and then there will be a dispute. To avoid all this I just keep it until the owner
comes for it.” 164

E. The Use of Public Order Institutions to Process Business Disputes
Although parties mutually settled most disputes, in some instances, one of the parties
sought assistance from the police or the chief. At other times, the threat of law enforcement was
enough to make the defaulting party comply with his contract obligations. For the most part,
customers called upon law enforcement, while the artisans preferred a mutual agreement with
customers without involving law enforcement.
Although customers rarely threatened artisans with the use of law enforcement, artisans
took threats seriously. During the year preceding the study, customers threatened to take less
than six percent (N=15) of the participants [artisans] to the police, four percent (N=11) to the
chief and less than two percent (N=5) to the court. 165 Almost all cases where a customer
threatened an artisan concerned the late completion of an order. In response, the artisans used
three different strategies to prevent a customer from acting on a threat: i) the artisan finished the
order quickly, before the customer could involve a third party; ii) the artisan explained the
advantage of settling the dispute amicably without outside involvement; or iii) the artisan
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pleaded with the customer to not hand him over to police or court custody. 166 The artisans were
able to convince customers not to involve third parties by explaining that third party involvement
would take time, would be costly, and would destroy the business relationship. One surveyed
artisan explained: “I promised the customer that I will do the job in time and also explained that
the chief will only take our money and then ask me to finish the work, and that is something we
can just sort out ourselves.” 167 Late delivery of an order is a civil matter, but some participants in
this study believed that any case that was brought before the court, whether civil or criminal,
could lead to imprisonment. 168 In this example, an entrepreneur threatened with court action by
a customer explained how he pleaded his case: “I looked for [the customer’s] house and went to
plead with him that I might be jailed and my family will suffer. He understood and we agreed on
the time I was to finish the work.” 169 However, the threat is often intended to just get the work
done. One threatened artisan recalled: “I started working on the order and also looking for
money from elsewhere so that when I am taken to court I can pay the bail. The customer came
back after about ten days and found the work finished. He said he was just threatening me so
that I would finish the work.” 170

1. The Chief
A chief is a civil servant in the provincial administration, who is mandated with
maintaining order in the area. 171 In order to prevent crimes, a chief may arrest any person who is
planning to commit an offense within the locality and take that person to the nearest police
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station. 172 However, a chief cannot retain anyone in his or her own custody. 173 In cases where
they do not have direct legal authority, chiefs often act as mediators in accordance with the
customs of their clan. 174
However, this study found that the institution of the chief plays only a marginal role
when settling business disputes; only two percent (N=5) of participants appeared before the chief
during the year preceding the study. 175 However, it is difficult to explain why the chief plays
such a marginal role. Time and money might explain why parties did not engage the chief more
often. As one focus group participant explained: “At the chief’s office, both the accused and the
complainant have to pay 100 shillings to help facilitate movement by the chief’s [assistants] to
summon [the parties]. The problem is that the chief can tell you he spent 200 shillings for soda,
like in my case. It’s a loss, because they always deduct it from the full amount [to be paid].”176
Thus, further research will have to be conducted to fully understand why the chief played such a
minor role to settle business disputes.

2. The Police
The chief has the mandate to hear civil disputes, but adjudicates disputes to a very limited
extent. More often, dissatisfied customers relied upon the police to arbitrate and enforce
resolutions to business disputes. 177
Police officers hear business disputes for a fee as a “side business.” 178 One business
owner explained: “At the police station, for them to come and arrest somebody you will need to
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pay 300 shillings or 400 or even 1000 shillings for their fare…. The police come from within
town but they charge so highly because they say that wasn’t their duty and they were not
assigned to do it and so you just have to pay them.” 179
During the year preceding the survey, five percent (N=13) of the participants had
appeared before the police to resolve a business disagreement. 180 In a majority of these cases,
the customers brought the case before the police. 181 The police often used strong-arm tactics in
handling a complaint and individual police officers handled cases differently. One study
participant said: “A customer accused me that I used sub-standard material for his work, but the
police understood that I had told the customer to add more money or else I would use the
material that the money could buy. The customer took the order as it was. [I was satisfied] but I
wasted time at the police station and also had to give the police 200 shillings for fuel when they
came to arrest me.” 182 However, it was more common for the police to use their power to press
the “defendant” to comply with the complaint rather than trying to understand the dispute. As
one participant explained: “[For not completing the order on time] the police locked me in for 3
days and still expected me to finish the work.” 183 One metalworker, who was held in police
custody for two days for not finishing an order on time, explained why some customers took
their complaints to the police: “All they want is a refund or their goods made, so what they do is
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to give the police some bribe so that we can be locked up in the cells until we agree to finish the
disputed product.” 184
Because of the relatively limited number of cases presented to the chief and the police, it
is difficult to determine why parties preferred police assistance over the chief’s assistance. As
the police heard the disputes in addition to their regular duties, they might have been more prone
to accept a bribe and to resolve the issue in favor of the party who paid the highest bribe. As a
result, parties may have sought outcomes at the police station because of its relative
predictability. Another possible reason for the parties using the police could be that the chief
cannot hold people in custody and so poses less of a threat. However, because the chief resolves
disputes with less confrontation than the police do, the parties have a higher chance of sustaining
the relationship.
Interestingly, entrepreneurs appeared reluctant to involve either the police or the chief in
settling business disputes. During the year preceding the study, only two artisans sought
assistance from the police or the chief to collect outstanding debts. 185 Although debt collection
was a common problem, entrepreneurs wrote off debts that they were unable to personally
collect. Artisans chose against involving the chief or the police because they found the
involvement to be time consuming, costly, and more importantly, a potential stain on their
reputation. One study participant stated: “The disadvantage is that if it goes to the police it only
spoils your reputation as an artisan.” 186 To avoid these confrontations, a majority of the artisans
operated on a strict, cash-only basis. 187
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3. The Court System
Throughout their careers, none of the participants had ever taken a contractual dispute to
court. Moreover, only four participants had hired a lawyer for a business-related matter. 188 In
three of those cases, the artisan engaged the lawyer to draft an agreement for a relatively large
order. In the fourth case, the business owner hired the lawyer to file a law suit. This owner
explained: “I wanted to grow my business and start a transport company. I bought a lorry and
fixed it up. I paid 90,000 shillings and was supposed to pay 230,000 shillings in total. I thought
I would fix it up and, once I started to use it, I would make more money and could pay it off. I
got new tires, I rebuilt the engine, I put a lot of money into it. Then the previous owner saw that
the lorry was running. He came and towed it away one day when I was not here. A friend
recommended a lawyer in Kisumu I went to see. The lawyer was supposed to sue him for taking
the lorry. I paid the lawyer 30,000 shillings, but he never sued him. He just ate my money. He
is still in Kisumu and avoids me. I still see the man with my lorry driving around here. I spent
everything I had on the lorry, fixing it up, and the lawyer. Now I just try to forget about it.” 189
Although the participants did not use the court system for business disputes, seventeen
percent (N=47) of the participants had been involved in court cases over other criminal or civil
issues. 190 In fact, the majority of the participants (86%, N=239) believed that courts could
resolve business disputes. 191 Moreover, seventy-nine percent (N=219) thought that it was wise
to use the courts to resolve disputes involving a large sum of money. 192 Furthermore, sixty-six
percent (N=184) of the respondents felt confident in the court’s ability to resolve a case fairly. 193
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However, eighty-nine percent (N=248) of the participants criticized the courts as an expensive
forum and only fifteen percent (N=42) thought that courts were time-efficient. 194 Participants
that had personal experience with the court system displayed little difference in their perceptions
about it. Consequently, a majority of the artisans believed that courts were impractical in dealing
with business disputes, yet the same artisans maintained the possibility of taking a case to court
in the future. In a sense, artisans acknowledged the courts as a necessary institution, but one that
failed to serve their current needs. Hence, the threshold to the courts was too high to be of
relevance to resolve business disputes generated by small businesses.

IV. Private Ordering: The Possibility of Mediation
Small business owners have few options for resolving their grievances. Options include
the police and the chief, but these venues have the shortcomings of being somewhat costly, time
consuming, and a potential harm to an artisan’s business reputation. One business owner said:
“Sometimes the case that you have taken to [the police] is worth about 1000 Shillings. They will
harass you and then take a bribe of 200 Shillings or more, then promise to look into the case.
After that it becomes a daily trip to the police station. At the end you waste your time and you
lose your money.” 195 Due to the cost, a business owner might not pursue the collection of an
unpaid debt. As one owner explained: “I went to the Administration Police [who works under
the chief] to help recover some money from a customer, but the A.P.s turned me away, saying
that the money that I needed was too little and there isn’t anything that will be left for them. And
so I had to let go of that debt.” 196
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In response to this problem, two small business associations included in this study have
recently created mediation committees to handle disputes. A member of the Mbili jua kali
association explained why they formed a mediation committee: “Before when there were
disputes, the cases would go to the police and the police would take you to the station and then
threaten you with court.… So we sat down and came up with a committee that if you had a
dispute with a customer that case would be taken to the committee and then the committee would
tell you what to do and how to go about it.” 197 In Mbili, if a customer brings a complaint against
a jua kali member to the police or the chief, the mediation committee, or caretaker committee,
requests that the police or the chief refer the case back to the association. A member explained
that “[t]he caretaker committee will go to the police and then explain to them that they belong to
an organization [that] is charged with handling cases before it goes to the police. Some
customers are not aware of this, so they go to the police to report the matter…. The police let
[us] solve the matter. Only when [we] can’t solve it, it is taken back to [the police].” 198 In the
Tatu jua kali association, a case can be withdrawn from the police or the chief if both parties
agree for the dispute committee to hear the case instead. 199 Once a case is decided, the dispute
committee in both locations appoints one or two “mediators” to supervise and ensure that the
committee decision is executed and both parties remain satisfied. 200
During the year preceding the study, only two of the seven business associations
surveyed provided mediation services to their members. The associations with mediation
services have a subcommittee that is charged with hearing disputes. The committees heard a
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relatively small number of cases during that year; one committee heard four cases and the other
heard five cases. 201 Four of the nine hearings were between members, three of which related to
accusations of stolen tools or other materials. 202 The fourth hearing related to the late repayment
of a loan that one member extended to another member to help him finish an order quickly. In
all nine cases handled through mediation, the parties and mediators knew each other well and
both parties were satisfied with the outcomes and the handling of the cases. 203
The remaining five cases were between members and their customers. 204 The members
initiated the mediation in all but one case. In four of these cases, the customer failed to collect
custom-made products on time and the entrepreneur sold the product to another customer. In
these cases, the mediation committees decided that the artisan had the right to sell the product if
the customer failed to collect the product within a reasonable time; although the entrepreneur
was directed to promptly remake the product for the customer at no extra charge. 205 For
instance, in one case, the customer came to collect his finished product three months after the
agreed date of collection. The artisan “felt that the customer took too long and decided to sell off
the good to recover... money that was trapped in it.” 206 In this case, both parties were satisfied
with the committee’s decision and the customer, thereafter, brought the artisan more work.
Finally, the last case concerned a disagreement over the specifications on a made-to-order
product. The mediation committee decided the case in the customer’s favor and, “the customer
was happy and up to date, he still brings the owner more business and work.” 207
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There are several advantages to using a business association’s mediation committee. The
service is free of charge, the dispute is heard by fellow artisans who have technical know-how,
and the issue is resolved quickly, in a non-confrontational manner. One study participant stated:
“You see, if a case is taken to the police they don’t understand [the business], all that they will
do is to tell you to make the product in two or three days. This will result in poor workmanship
and the customer won’t be happy with it. But if it is taken to the committee, they understand
how business operates and they will give enough time to make the product and this will make the
customer happy.” 208
However, for a business association to provide mediation services, the organization has to
be well-managed and transparent and to have some level of oversight by its members. The
members have to trust their leaders and the general public has to trust that the association has the
capacity and integrity to hear and decide disputes without bias. Of the seven business
associations at which the study looked, only two, Mbili and Tatu, had the capacity to provide
mediation services. 209 Therefore, these types of mediation services were not readily available.
In some towns they were not available at all, while in other towns it was only available to
members and their customers. 210
Secondly, this dispute mechanism will only be used if it is perceived as unbiased and
without favoritism for its own members. To explore this topic, the study asked artisans who
were not members of the association if they thought that the business association in their town
could resolve a business related disagreement between them and a member of the association in a
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fair manner. Thirty-one percent (N=40) of the respondents 211 thought that the disagreement
would be resolved fairly, fifty-five percent (N=72) did not think the mediation would be fair, and
fourteen percent (N=18) were unsure. 212 A majority of those who thought the decision would be
unfair believed that the committee would favor their own members. 213 In addition, some
respondents thought that the associations lacked competence to mediate business disputes. 214
However, those that thought the associations could be a fair mediator, perceived the association
to have the capacity and technical expertise to handle business disputes. 215 Others trusted the
associations because of previous business dealings with individual members or thought the
committee would be unbiased in order to maintain the association’s reputation. 216 One
participant noted: “They know that if it is not fair, it will spoil their business and the name of the
association.” 217

Conclusion
In this study, we observed that business owners have distinct relationships with their
customers and suppliers. We found that there are few suppliers in each town and each artisan
has a very limited number of regular suppliers (mean = 2). When there is a long-term business
relationship between the supplier and artisan, suppliers offer preferred prices and extend credit;
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and the artisans are loyal to their suppliers and always pay on time. There were relatively few
business disputes between entrepreneurs and their suppliers and when disputes occurred, they
were always resolved without involving a third party. There were two possible courses of action
to processing these disputes: (i) if the business owner did not deem the relationship worth
maintaining, he or she did not engage in further transactions with the supplier; or (ii) if the
entrepreneur deemed the business relationship valuable, he or she took care to maintain the
relation by negotiating a mutually satisfactory resolution. 218 In particular, entrepreneurs take
great care to preserve their relationship with a supplier that extends them credit and business
disputes were, therefore, extremely rare.
However, breaches of contract were commonplace between artisans and their customers.
In many instances, the parties resolved their disputes through contract flexibility. However, it is
very challenging for the entrepreneurs to collect debts from their customers. In general, the
transactions between a particular customer and a firm occurred much more infrequently than the
transaction between a particular supplier and a firm. Moreover, the abundance of firms
performing similar services made artisans more easily replaceable. Hence, unlike the contracts
between entrepreneurs and suppliers, the contracts between entrepreneurs and their customers
are not self-enforced. For example, in debt collection disputes with a customer involving small
amounts of money, the aggrieved business owner would often be resigned to the breach of
contract and take no further action. 219 However, for many business owners, the debt collection
grievances added up and became burdensome. Out of fear of spoiling their business reputation
and due to the harsh methods the police used, entrepreneurs were reluctant to seek the assistance
of the chief or the police in processing disputes. Therefore, the business owners’ inability to
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recover outstanding loans affected their business practices and many chose to forgo transactions
by not extending credit.
The absence of a systematic means to gather the credit history of their customers was an
underlying reason for the firms’ reluctance to extend credit. Studies have shown that
information-sharing can increase lending and reduce default rates. 220 Future studies addressing
the relevance of asymmetric information would be useful. For instance, it would be of interest to
explore how information could be exchanged through “brokers” or credit bureaus. These credit
bureaus could be voluntary or mandated through regulation. 221 Hence, by accessing accurate
information about business partners’ previous transactions (both good and bad credit history) it
appears that many disputes could be prevented.
However, when disputes occurred and the parties could not reach a mutual agreement, the
business owners surveyed in this study had very limited options for processing their disputes in a
satisfactory manner. This study found that the police utilized their power to extort
“compliance.” 222 However, due to the confrontational nature of the tactics the police utilize,
disputes settled by the police tended to terminate the relationship after the disputed transaction
was completed. On the other hand, the chief settled disputes in a less confrontational manner so
the parties could more easily continue their relationship after the settlement.
Interestingly, customers preferred to take their case to the police over the chief. The
reason for this preference is not fully understood and would need to be further researched, but
the confrontational nature of the police hearings, and the use or threat of violence in custody,
appears to have appealed to aggrieved customers seeking a particular outcome to an ongoing
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dispute. However, customers initiated these processes while entrepreneurs were less likely to
seek out these venues to settle disputes with their customers. 223 Courts, on the other hand, were
generally perceived to be reliable, but impractical to use. It is against this background that
business associations created mediation committees to assist their members in processing
disputes. The restorative procedures and the fast and inexpensive hearings that mediation
committees provided met the business owners’ need to resolve conflicts in an amicable manner
that allowed the parties to transact business in the future.
Although the mediation mechanism provided by two small business associations included
in this study has some clear advantages, it has very little reach in its current format. As the
association members were primarily transacting with non-member business partners, the
business associations had few opportunities to regulate their members’ behavior and members
were not expected to adhere to the group’s internal rules in order to be able to transact in the
future. 224 Hence, to serve their members’ need to process their business disputes in a less
confrontational setting, the associations had to offer their mediation services to their members
and their non-member business partners.
However, entrepreneurs that were not members of the associations were skeptical of the
committees’ ability to independently adjudicate a dispute involving one of their members. The
committee members recognize that their services have limited reach in the current format
because the mediation committees are not endorsed by the state. As one surveyed member said:
“[A] small business court here is a good idea because at times you do business with an outsider
and have a dispute with him or her, [but] they are not under the dispute and caretaker committee.
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These cases will be taken to the police and will take a long a time, but if it is taken to this court
here maybe [it] will be faster.” 225 Therefore, to address this problem, a public-private hybrid that
would be similar to the “tuna court” described by Feldman, 226 where the state provides
guidelines and some over-sight of the mediation carried out by respected artisans in the
community, is an idea worth further consideration.
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